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COMMENTAIRES 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONFLICT MODELS: 
THEIR APPLICABILITY TO THE THEORY 
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Frank REID 
Psychological conflict models were first applied to the theory of 
collective bargaining in an imaginative paper by Professor Cari Stevens 
(1958). The model is based on the psychological concept of approach 
and avoidance gradients, the slopes of which are determined on the 
basis of évidence from psychological experiments. In the présent paper 
it is argued that the concepts of approach and avoidance gradients used 
by psychologists, and the related empirical évidence, are inapplicable to 
the collective bargaining process because of a fondamental différence 
between the two situations. As a resuit of this différence, the nature of 
which will be analyzed below, the model suffers from an internai logical 
inconsistency. 
This criticism is important because the Stevens model has become 
a well-established component of bargaining theory. As évidence of its 
prominence, note that the Stevens model is one of only three bargain-
ing models referred to in the récent textbook by Rees (1973); it is one 
of the two main papers reprinted in the section on bargaining theory in 
the McConnell (1970) book of readings ; and it is the only paper included 
in bargaining theory section of the McCormick and Smith (1968) book 
of readings. 
First Stevens' model will be very briefly summarized. An approach 
or avoidance gradient is a function relating an individual's tendency to 
approach or avoid the goal to his distance from that goal. On the basis 
of expérimental évidence from psychology, Stevens assumes that both 
approach and avoidance gradients are upward-sloping towards the 
goal; i.e., the closer a subject is to a positive goal the greater his désire 
to approach it and the closer he is to a négative goal the greater his 
désire to avoid it. 
* REID, F., Assistant professor, Center for Industrial Relations, University of 
Toronto, Toronto, the author is grateful to Noah Meltz for several helpful comments 
which improved the exposition. 
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Stevens' model is shown in Figure 1, which illustrâtes two Com-
pany avoidance gradients. Wc is the wage rate (i.e. goal) preferred by 
the company and Vc indicates the company's tendency to avoid this 
goal (because the high probability of a strike to attain such a wage rate 
reduces expected profits). Vu expresses the company's tendency to 
avoid the union goal, Wu (because high wages reduce profits). A stable 
«equilibrium» for the company occurs at wage We, where the strength 
of the company's tendencies to avoid Wc and Wu are equal. 
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Both the company and the union will hâve equilibrium positions 
determined by a set of avoidance gradients and, in gênerai, the positions 
will not coincide. Negotiation tactics, which Stevens interprets as 
attempts to shift the other party's equilibrium to a position closer to 
one's own goal, are categorized in two classes. Class I tactics are de-
fined as those which increase the other party's avoidance to his own 
goal. For example, a union Class I tactic would resuit in an upward 
shift of Vc in Figure 1, moving the company's equilibrium position closer 
to the union goal, Wu. Class II tactics decrease the other party's avoidance 
to one's own goal; i.e. a downward shift of Vu in Figure 1. Stevens 
notes an important asymmetry in that Class I tactics increase the amount 
of tension (tendency to avoid both goals) at the equilibrium wage, there-
by increasing the probability of a breakdown in negotiations. Class II 
tactics, on the other hand, decrease tension at the equilibrium wage 
and increase the probability of a seulement being achieved. 
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Notice that, as in most other bargaining models, the solution is 
indeterminate. Even with perfect knowledge of ail four avoidance 
gradients the outcome of negotiations cannot be predicted — the resuit 
dépends on the way in which the gradients are shifted in the course 
of bargaining. 
In order to judge the applicability to the collective bargaining 
situation of Stevens' assumption of upward-sloping approach and 
avoidance gradients, it is necessary to examine more closely the psycho-
logical évidence upon which this assumption is based. Expérimental 
évidence (Miller, 1944) has shown that when rats are temporarily restrain-
ed in their approach to a positive goal (food), they pull harder against 
the restraint the nearer they are to the goal, implying upward-sloping 
approach gradients. In a similar experiment using an electric shock as 
a négative goal it was found that the nearer rates are placed to the 
point of the electric shock, the harder they strain to move away, i.e., 
avoidance gradients are also upward-sloping. 
The fundamental différence between the rat experiment and the 
collective bargaining situation may now be seen. Consider the upward-
sloping approach gradient. In the rat experiment no satisfaction is 
achieved until the subject actually reaches its goal — it is what may 
be called an all-or-nothing situation. In this situation it is understandable 
that the tendency to approach a positive goal would increase, or at 
least remain constant, as the goal is approached. Collective bargaining, 
however, is an instance of what may be called a continuum situation. 
For example, as a union moves from a low wage position towards a 
high wage goal it receives some satisfaction from each successive wage 
incrément. Economie utility analysis suggests that in such a situation 
the tendency to continue pressing for a further incrément will decrease 
as the goal is approached. That is, in a continuum situation, approach 
gradients are downward-sloping. 
What about the slope of avoidance gradients in a continuum situa-
tion? To answer this question, another fundamental différence between 
a continuum and an all-or-nothing situation may be noted. In the former, 
there is a continuous scale, one end of which is a positive goal and 
the other a négative goal. A tendency to approach the positive goal is, 
at the same time, a tendency to avoid the négative goal. That is, in 
the continuum situation, the approach gradient (with respect to the 
positive goal) and the avoidance gradient (with respect to the négative 
goal) are simply two sides of the same coin. Hence downward-sloping 
approach gradients in the continuum situation logically imply upward-
sloping avoidance gradients. 
For example, if a subject's tendency to approach the positive goal 
decreases as he nears the goal (downward-sloping approach gradient), 
then it is implied that his tendency to avoid the négative goal also 
decreases as he moves further from it (an upward-sloping avoidance 
gradient). Thus, in his analysis of collective bargaining, a continuum 
situation, Stevens' assumption that approach gradients are upward slop-
ing is inconsistent with his assumption of upward-sloping avoidance 
gradients. 
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Note that the argument being made hère is not that évidence from 
rate experiments is never applicable to the analysis of collective bar-
gaining — one might well devise experiments which would be relevant. 
The argument is rather that there is a logical inconsistency in assuming 
that both approach and avoidance gradients are upward sloping in a con-
tinuum situation. 
One might ask how Stevens is able to obtain such «reasonable» 
results from his model, given the inconsistency outlined above. The 
answer is that although Stevens introduces approach gradients and 
incorrectly assumes they are upward sloping, he does not make use of 
approach gradients in his analysis. Thus the results of Stevens' analysis, 
based only on the assumption of upward-sloping avoidance gradients, 
are correct, although the justification for his fundamental slope assump-
tions is faulty. 
It is possible to rescue the analysis by using an économie utility 
analysis to dérive the slope of the avoidance gradients. But in that 
case, it is not clear that there is any great advantage in formulating the 
model in terms of approach and avoidance gradients rather than in more 
conventional économie terms. 
The conclusion of the above discussion is that, since collective 
bargaining is a continuum situation, it is inappropriate to analyze the 
process using psychological conflict models which are based on empirical 
évidence from an all-or-nothing situation. Attempts to do so may resuit 
in logical inconsistencies in the analysis. 
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